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ARTICLE
BUSINESS AS USUAL: HOBBY LOBBY AND
THE PURPOSE OF CORPORATE RIGHTS
Dalia T. Mitchell*
This article explores the interdependence of the discourse of
corporate rights and the law of corporate purpose. I argue that
the history of corporate rights reflects changing reactions of the
U.S. Supreme Court to social, political, and cultural concerns,
each reaction offering a different purpose for corporations in
our modern society. At the turn of the twentieth century, in
response to fears about the advance of socialism, the Court
used liberal assumptions to justify protecting the publicly held
corporation’s property rights as derived from the rights of
individual shareholders. In so doing, the Court helped turn the
corporation, with its collective ownership, into the epitome of
capitalism. In the 1940s, as fears about the potential impact of
European totalitarianism on American democracy mounted,
the Court drew on theories of pluralism, which focused on
corporate power, to impose constitutional limitations on
private entities and organizations. The corporation became the
guardian of American democracy. Beginning in the 1970s,
amidst concerns about the potential threat that large
corporations posed to economic and political markets, the
Court relied on the managerialist view that corporate
managers were best suited to attend to the affairs of their
corporations to rationalize the extension of First Amendment
rights to corporations. Even when the Court acknowledged
corporate management’s responsibility to the shareholders, it
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University. I am grateful
to Ernie Englander for comments on earlier drafts, to members of the
Columbia Business Law Review, especially Meg Hirsh, Taylor Sutton, and
Adam Voron, for their excellent editorial assistance, and to the George
Washington University Summer Research Fund for financial support. All
errors are mine.
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dismissed concerns about management’s usage of shareholder
funds to promote corporate goals with which the shareholders
might not agree. Questions about corporate rights and
corporate purpose became questions of business judgment, and
corporate managers became the mediators of American
society’s social and cultural goals.
I.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 12, 2012, the Green family, as owners and
managers of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,1 a for-profit
corporation with over 13,000 employees, brought suit against
the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, challenging the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act’s requirement that employment-based group health
care plans provide, among other preventive care means,
contraceptive methods approved by the Food and Drug
Administration.2 The Greens argued that this requirement
1 For a detailed analysis of the ownership structure of Hobby Lobby,
see Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE
RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 149, 152 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad
Flanders & Zoë Robinson eds., 2016).
2 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 697–98 (2014).
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violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).3 Writing for the Court,
Justice Samuel Alito held:
[T]he owners of . . . the companies [did not] forfeit[] all
RFRA protection when they decided to organize their
businesses as corporations rather than sole
proprietorships or general partnerships. The plain
terms of RFRA make it perfectly clear that Congress
did not discriminate in this way against men and
women who wish to run their businesses as for-profit
corporations in the manner required by their religious
beliefs.4

Hobby Lobby met with strong reactions from corporate law
scholars. Leo Strine, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Delaware, wrote that “if . . . Hobby Lobby elevates the power
of corporate managers over that of secular society, then the
argument that corporate law should focus only on stockholder
welfare, rather than the best interests of all those affected by
corporate behavior, is weakened.”5 In turn, David Millon and
Lyman Johnson, strong proponents of the idea that
corporations have social responsibilities beyond the
maximization of value for their shareholders, were quick to
announce that Hobby Lobby “will reshape fundamentally how
business people, lawyers, legal and business scholars
(particularly, corporate law professors), as well as ordinary
citizens, think about the permitted objectives of business
corporations in a free society, objectives that extend . . . into
the larger realm of corporate social responsibility of all
kinds.”6
Id. at 701.
Id. at 691.
5 Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of
Corporate Paternalism and its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71,
76 (2015).
6 Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby,
70 BUS. LAW. 1, 2–3 (2015) (footnote omitted); see also Hobby Lobby, 573
U.S. at 756–57 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s determination that
RFRA extends to for-profit corporations is bound to have untoward effects.
Although the Court attempts to cabin its language to closely held
3
4
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Notably, while Justice Alito focused on the rights of Hobby
Lobby’s owners, corporate jurists emphasized that the
decision affected the discretion of corporate managers,
suggesting that the discourse of corporate rights, as developed
by the U.S. Supreme Court, impacts the law of corporate
purpose, as developed in state courts. Seeking further to
evaluate the relationship between these two discourses, this
Article examines the history of corporate rights through the
lenses of corporate law and theory, specifically the law and
theory of corporate purpose. I argue that throughout the
twentieth century, the discourse of corporate rights reflected
changing reactions of the U.S. Supreme Court to social,
political, and cultural concerns, each reaction offering a
different purpose for corporations in our modern society.
I have previously explored how state courts used the
rhetoric of corporate purpose to empower corporate managers
to address apprehension about socialism at the turn of the
twentieth century, about totalitarianism and the survival of
democracy in the midcentury, and about the success of
economic and political markets at the end of the twentieth
century.7 In this Article, I argue that similar concerns helped
shape jurists’ conceptualizations of the nature of corporate
entities and corporate rights. By the turn of the twenty-first
century, despite rhetoric that at times suggested otherwise,
the discourse of corporate rights and the law of corporate
purpose converged on empowering corporate managers to run
corporations without intervention by shareholders, other
stakeholders, or the courts. Questions about corporate rights
and corporate purpose thus became questions of business
judgment.

corporations, its logic extends to corporations of any size, public or private.
Little doubt that RFRA claims will proliferate, for the Court’s expansive
notion of corporate personhood—combined with its other errors in
construing RFRA—invites for-profit entities to seek religion-based
exemptions from regulations they deem offensive to their faith.” (footnote
omitted)).
7 See generally Dalia T. Mitchell, From Dodge to eBay: The Elusive
Corporate Purpose, 13 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 155 (2019).
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As this Article demonstrates, in responding to political,
social, and cultural concerns, jurists drew upon three
paradigms—a liberal paradigm, a pluralist paradigm, and a
managerialist paradigm. Proponents of the liberal paradigm
attempted to fit corporations—an anomaly to classical liberal
thought that conceptualized the world as sharply divided
between state power and individual right holders—within the
U.S. constitutional tradition; to do so, they described
corporations either as individuals (or persons) or as
aggregations of individuals.8 In turn, proponents of a pluralist
vision of the corporation—a vision grounded in a critique of
classical liberalism—recognized the realities of corporate
power and attempted to constrain it as one would tame
government power.9 If the liberal paradigm lent itself to
supporting corporate rights, advocates of the pluralist vision
promoted imposing public limits and constitutional
restrictions on corporate powers.10 Finally, managerialists
turned attention away from power and toward corporate
hierarchies and advocated allowing managers freely to attend
to the affairs of their corporations, including corporate
purpose and rights.11

See infra Part II.A.
In contemporary political science and legal scholarship, the term
pluralism is often associated with interest group theories of democracy,
which scholars like Robert Dahl articulated during the 1950s and 1960s.
See, e.g., generally ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY
(1956); ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES:
CONFLICT AND CONSENT (1967). In anthropological and sociological studies,
the term legal pluralism is often used to describe the multiplicity of
normative centers or institutions in society. See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry,
Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 869–72 (1988). I use the term
pluralism to refer to early-twentieth century pluralists, who envisioned
corporations not as associations of individuals (or interest groups) but as
real entities with power similar to the power of the sovereign state. For
these pluralists, groups and organizations formed the foundation of the
modern state. See Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and
Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
179, 189–94 (2005) (reviewing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Macmillan 1932)).
10 See infra Part III.A.
11 See infra Part IV.A.
8
9
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To a large extent, these three paradigms developed in
parallel lines, each being prominent at a different period as a
response to particular social, economic, and political concerns;
the three core parts of the Article correspond to these periods.
Part II, Liberal Grounds, explores the dominance of the
liberal paradigm at the turn of the twentieth century and how,
in its decisions in that era, the U.S. Supreme Court
consistently envisioned corporations as aggregations of
individuals (and sometimes as individuals).12 Reacting to
fears about the advance of socialism, the Court used liberal
assumptions to justify protecting the publicly held
corporation’s property rights, as derived from the rights of
individual shareholders-members, from encroachment by the
states.13 The corporation, with its collective ownership,
became the epitome of capitalism.
Part III, Pluralist Challenges, demonstrates how, in the
1940s, as fears about the potential impact of European
totalitarianism on American democracy mounted, the Court
drew on pluralist ideas not to endow corporations with rights
but rather to prevent certain private entities and
organizations from limiting individual liberties (especially
freedom of speech), on the one hand, and, on the other, to
ensure that individual members of vulnerable groups and
organizations enjoy their liberty rights (especially freedom of
association).14 The corporation, the bastion of capitalism,
became the guardian of American democracy.
Yet, as Part IV, Managerialist Solutions, explores, by the
last decades of the twentieth century, the democratic-pluralist
12

See, e.g., Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 409

(1886).
13 On extending rights to corporations to protect the rights of their
individual members, see, e.g., Margaret M. Blair and Elizabeth Pollman,
The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1673, 1680–1696 (2015).
14 For example, in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Court
protected an individual’s First Amendment rights from encroachment by a
company town. Later, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958), the Court focused on protecting the NAACP from potential scrutiny
by the state so as to protect the First Amendment rights of the association’s
individual members.
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ideal was replaced by a managerialist one,15 and corporations
gained liberty rights. When the Court, expressing a strong
commitment to the free market of ideas and consumerism,
extended First Amendment rights to corporations so as to
ensure that individuals had access to information,16 it
endorsed the idea that corporate managers could spend
corporate (and shareholders’) funds to pursue goals they
deemed appropriate, including those affecting the property
and liberty rights of others, whether shareholders or other
stakeholders. Corporations and their managers became the
mediators of American society’s social and cultural goals.
As the Article concludes, by the turn of the twenty-first
century, amid concerns about the threat that large
corporations could pose to the market economy, the rhetoric of
shareholder wealth maximization came to dominate corporate
law.17 Yet, just as state courts continued to empower
managers to define the shareholders’ interest, the U.S.
Supreme Court, while acknowledging the need to protect
shareholders, dismissed concerns about management’s usage
of shareholder funds to promote corporate speech with which
the shareholders might not agree. The Court simply endorsed
the corporate law adage according to which shareholders who
were not happy with their managers could either vote them
out or sell their shares. “That is the deal,” Justice Antonin
Scalia announced in his dissent in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce.18 In Citizens United v. Federal

15
See Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law is Dead”: Heroic
Managerialism, Legal Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the
Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 305, 331–35 (2013).
16 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
17 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a
Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure
Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 761, 768 (2015) (“Despite attempts to muddy the doctrinal waters, a
clear-eyed look at the law of corporations in Delaware reveals that, within
the limits of their discretion, directors must make stockholder welfare their
sole end, and that other interests may be taken into consideration only as a
means of promoting stockholder welfare.”); Mitchell, supra note 7, at 202–
07.
18 494 U.S. 652, 686 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Election Commission, the Court’s majority affirmed that
deal,19 and, as this Article argues, so did the Court in Hobby
Lobby. It so happened that the Green family both owned and
managed the corporation.20
In his thorough exploration of the history of corporate
rights, Adam Winkler argues that corporations gained, first,
economic, then, liberty rights by relying upon the idea that
corporations are associations of individuals whose
constitutional rights merit protection.21 Hobby Lobby was
accordingly the culmination of a century-long crusade by
corporations to gain civil rights—from protection of their
property in the early decades of the twentieth century, to
speech rights in the midcentury years, to religious rights in
the first decades of the twenty-first century.22 By exploring the
history of corporate rights as intertwining with the history of
corporate purpose and corporate law and theory more broadly,
this Article adds another dimension to the narrative: it
illustrates how extending rights to corporations, throughout
the past century, was the U.S. Supreme Court’s means of
finding a purpose for corporations. Viewed through the prism
of corporate law, Hobby Lobby simply legitimatized the power
of corporate managers to define their corporation’s purpose.

II. LIBERAL GROUNDS
This Part explores how, at the turn of the twentieth
century, as legal scholars struggled to (re)define the nature of
corporate entities to fit the realities of the changing public
19

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62

(2010).
20 David Green describes Hobby Lobby as a family-owned rather than
shareholder-owned company. DAVID GREEN WITH DEAN MERRILL, MORE THAN
A HOBBY: HOW A $600 START-UP BECAME AMERICA’S HOME & CRAFT
SUPERSTORE 11 (2005).
21 See generally ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW
AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018).
22 See Adam Winkler, Corporations are People, and They Have More
Rights than You, THE HUFFINGTON POST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
corporations-are-people-a_b_5543833 [https://perma.cc/KK4A-XXJM] (last
updated Aug. 30, 2014).
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corporation, they developed two liberal visions of the
corporation: a contractual vision that likened corporations to
associations of individuals, and a natural entity theory that
portrayed corporations as natural entities akin to natural
persons. It further demonstrates how the Lochner-era
Supreme Court drew upon the contractual paradigm to
protect the economic rights of corporations so as to defend the
modern American state against the perceived threat of
socialism.

A. Conceptualizing the Corporation at a Century’s End
Corporations have historically represented an anomaly to
liberal legal thinkers who envisioned the world as sharply
divided between state power and individual right holders.23 A
corporation was both—an association of individual right
holders, on the one hand, and an entity with sovereign-like
powers, on the other.24 For eighteenth-century thinkers, the
continued existence of corporations demonstrated the failure
of liberal efforts to destroy the intermediate forms (i.e., guilds)
associated with medieval life.25 Early nineteenth century legal
doctrine eased the tension by dividing corporations into two
different classes—public corporations, such as municipal
associations, that “assimilated to the role of the state,” and
private corporations, such as business organizations, that
“assimilated to the role of an individual in society.”26
The categorization of corporations as private or public
organizations shaped the boundaries of their autonomy. 27
Courts compared municipal associations to governments in
order to support the imposition of checks on their powers—
checks that were similar to the limits imposed on sovereign
powers.28 By analogizing commercial (as well as charitable)
corporations to private individuals, the courts ensured that
23 See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1057, 1099 (1980).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See id. at 1100.
28 See id. at 1100–01.
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business corporations would be subject to more limited checks
on their powers.29 Private corporations were viewed as
artificial entities (unlike real persons) created by a charter or
a grant of the state—the charter being a contract between the
sovereign and those seeking incorporation.30 Corporate
charters included restrictions on the activities in which a
corporation could engage, the corporation’s rights in property,
the length of the corporation’s existence, the amount of capital
it could raise, and how profit would be applied, as well as
provisions addressing shareholders’ powers and liabilities.31
By the late nineteenth century, however, the depiction of
corporations as artificial entities, also known as the
concession paradigm,32 lost much of its credibility as the
requirement for a state charter was reduced from a means of
controlling corporations to a mere formality. 33 Growing
consumer demand, increasing numbers of workers, an
expanding pool of capital, and the quickly developing national
railroads and telegraph networks enabled the creation of large
enterprises, while corporate lawyers devised different legal
tools to allow their clients to increase the scope of their
operations so as to avoid destructive competition among large
businesses.34 Trusts, holding companies, and mergers became
common, even if often contested in state courts.35 Beginning
29
30

See id.
Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636

(1819).
31 P.M. Vasudev, Corporate Law and Its Efficiency: A Review of
History, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 237, 246 tbl.2 (2010).
32 See, e.g., Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession:
The Public Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 208
(2006).
33 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 77–78 (1992); Gregory A. Mark,
The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1441, 1455–56 (1987).
34 Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of
Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1514–15 (2006).
35 On the development of the large publicly held corporation and the
legal changes that accommodated it, see H ORWITZ, supra note 33, at 65–107;
DOUGLAS M. EICHAR, THE RISE AND FALL OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 20 (2017) (discussing the effects of competition on the
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in the 1880s, states changed their corporate laws to remove
“restrictions on . . . capitalization and assets, mergers and
consolidations, the issuance of voting stock, the purpose(s) of
incorporation, and the duration and locale of business.”36 By
the late 1890s, gone were the nineteenth-century legislative
constraints on corporations’ powers, as well as limitations on
their capital structure.37
To accommodate the demise of the concession paradigm of
the corporation and the quickly-developing large, publicly
held corporation, legal thinkers adopted either a contractual
or a natural entity vision of the corporation.38 The contractual
paradigm described corporations as aggregations of
individuals, similar to partnerships.39 In contrast, the natural
entity paradigm portrayed corporations as distinct from their
individual members, though, like individuals, they had real
existence.40
Both the contractual and natural entity theories were
grounded in what legal historian Morton Horwitz has labeled
“‘methodological individualism,’ that is, the view that the only
real starting point for political and legal theory is the
individual.”41 Yet only the entity theory was adaptable to the
realities of the modern corporation.42 While antebellum
businesses were single-unit enterprises owned by small
groups of investors, in the early-twentieth century big

development of the modern corporation); JULIA C. OTT, WHEN WALL STREET
MET MAIN STREET: THE QUEST FOR AN INVESTORS’ DEMOCRACY 19–20 (2011)
(discussing the growth of trusts).
36 SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT: LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 60 (1996).
37 See id. (“When Delaware joined the bandwagon in 1899 . . . the new
course was firmly set.”).
38 David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 211
(1990); Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of
Organizational “Real Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 579–80 (1989);
Mark, supra note 33, at 1444–49.
39 Hager, supra note 38, at 580.
40 Id.
41 HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 72.
42 Millon, supra note 38, at 214.
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businesses were multiunit enterprises.43 Getting outputs from
the new economies of scale required large capital investments,
which most individuals lacked, so firms began to draw capital
from many dispersed individuals.44 Paid skilled executives
took control over the day-to-day operations of the business,
and the large corporation was rapidly characterized by
dispersed shareholders and centralized management.45 The
contractual paradigm could not accommodate these dramatic
changes in business structure.46 Representing the corporation
as the aggregate property of its shareholders simply ignored
the reality that, as ownership in large public corporations was
increasingly separated from control, the owners’ liability
became limited.47
Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court chose to ignore novel
business realities, treating corporations as associations of
shareholders and corporate rights as derived from the rights
of the shareholders.48 Beginning with its well-known 1886
decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Co.—a case addressing California’s tax laws affecting
corporate property49—the Court consistently declared that the
safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
and Due Process clauses protected corporations because their
members, the shareholders, were so protected.50
43 See MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND I NDUSTRIAL
DIVIDE 49–72 (1984) (discussing how the early-twentieth century
development of mass production as the dominant form of industrial
organization resulted in the construction of giant corporations capable of
balancing supply and demand in their respective industries).
44 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 4 (1994).
45 Id.; see also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE H AND: THE
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 490–500 (1977)
(examining the modern shift toward managers running large corporations
and its effect on the concentration in American industries).
46 Mark, supra note 33, at 1464–65.
47 See id. at 1472–73.
48 See generally Blair and Pollman, supra note 13.
49 118 U.S. 394, 397 (1886); WINKLER, supra note 21, at 144.
50 Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396; see also HORWITZ, supra note 33, at
69–70 (describing arguments made prior to and in connection with Santa
Clara).
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It is important to stress that the Court’s decision in Santa
Clara did not endorse the natural entity theory (or the idea
that corporations were persons). As Margaret Blair and
Elizabeth Pollman have demonstrated, throughout the early
decades of the twentieth century (and even later), the Court
had only tentatively accepted the natural entity paradigm. 51
Still, the Court’s embrace of the vision of corporations as
associations of shareholders helped support the underlying
liberal assumptions of the natural entity theory and thus the
cultural idea that corporations were persons rather than mere
artificial entities. As Morton Horwitz explains, by “[r]easoning
from individualist premises,” contractualists were able to call
attention to
the anomalous character of the artificial entity theory
of the corporation, not only because it clashed with the
underlying spirit of general incorporation laws but
also because of its hostility to any theory of natural
rights. . . . [T]he artificial entity theory represented a
standing reminder of the social creation of property
rights.52

In contrast, “contractualists worked from a conception of
property as existing prior to the state.”53 So conceived,
property had to be protected from the coercive power of the
state. By extending the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment to corporations, even if derivatively, the Court
was able to legitimate big business and mask both its creation
by the state and its power.54
Ironically, the Court was not necessarily keen on
promoting big business. As Section II.B explicates, coming
amidst growing fears about socialism (and other forms of
collectivism), the Court’s decisions reflected the Court’s
ambivalence toward the concept of corporate rights and
See Blair & Pollman, supra note 13, at 1731–32.
HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 103–04.
53 Id. at 104.
54 See id. at 68, 79; see also Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the
Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 589
(1990) (“Once armed with the fourteenth amendment, corporations wielded
it with considerable force.”).
51
52
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corporations more broadly. Rather than evaluating the nature
of corporate entities, the Court focused on protecting the
property rights of the corporation’s members—the
shareholder-owners. As I argue, given the Court’s concerns
about the social and political ramifications of treating
property rights as anything but natural, protecting
shareholders’ property rights was not intended to empower
corporations or shareholders; it was, rather, a means of
fighting what the Court deemed a prominent threat to the
survival of American society at the time: socialism.

B. Corporate Property Rights and the Fear of Socialism
The rapidly growing public corporations generated serious
concerns about their economic, social, and political powers. In
1874, Thomas Cooley cautioned that state enabling laws
allowed “the most enormous and threatening powers in our
country” to flourish.55 Corporations, Cooley warned, were
quickly obtaining “greater influence in the country at large
and upon the legislation of the country than the States to
which they owe their corporate existence.”56 Similarly, a 1913
Yale Law Journal article began by noting that “[t]he dominion
of corporate power is greater than the general public
comprehend, also the evils which infest these creatures of the
law are skilfully [sic] and secretly destroying the inalienable
rights of personal liberty while the people are lingering.”57 “By
the Second decade of the [twentieth] century,” Alfred
Chandler has explained, “[m]odern business enterprises
dominated major American industries, and most of these

See Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Corporate Privileges for the Public
Benefit: The Progressive Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern
Regulatory State, 77 VA. L. REV. 603, 619 (1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION 279 n.2 (3d ed. 1874)).
56 COOLEY, supra note 55, at 280 n.2.
57 J. Newton Baker, The Evil of Special Privilege, 22 YALE L.J. 220,
220 (1913).
55
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same firms continued to dominate their industries for
decades.”58
The separation between ownership and control in the large
publicly held corporation exacerbated the early-twentieth
century agitation over the concentration of corporate power.
For one thing, the 1913 report of the Pujo Committee
announced the existence of a money trust, consisting of a
small number of financiers sitting on multiple corporate
boards. According to the report, these financiers controlled the
economy with the assistance of the New York Stock Exchange,
which allowed stock price manipulation techniques to the
detriment of working- and middle-class individual investors.59
A year later, Louis Brandeis explained that “[t]he goose that
lays golden eggs has been considered a most valuable
possession. But even more profitable is the privilege of taking
the golden eggs laid by somebody else’s goose.”60 By
controlling other people’s money, investment bankers and
their associates could “control the people through the people’s
own money.”61
Progressives worried about the concentration of power in
large business corporations. Especially given the separation
of ownership from control, they feared that corporations were
wearing away the function of the individual producer and,
with it, nineteenth-century democratic and economic ideals—
that is, the power of markets to distribute equally the rewards
of individual industry and to help conform individual liberty
CHANDLER, supra note 45, at 345.
See OTT, supra note 35, at 32–33.
60 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS
USE IT 17–18 (1914).
61 Id. A couple of decades later, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C.
Means noted that the multiplicity of owners of corporations created
“tremendous aggregations of property,” facilitating possible accumulations
of power (in the hands of the control group). ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER
C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 5 (1932). The
prospect of mass concentration of power augmented the risk of inefficient
uses of power and the potential adverse effect of corporations on the
economy at large. See id. at 6–7. Because Berle and Means’s argument
focused on publicly held corporations (which they labeled “quasi-public”),
they viewed the consolidation of power and the separation of ownership
from control as interrelated phenomena. Id. at 5.
58
59
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to socially beneficial goals.62 For some, individual ownership
of property and participation in the market economy were a
means of cultivating social and political citizenship. They saw
in the corporation’s collective ownership a threat to the idea
of “ordinary ‘producers’” who “shape their world on equal
footing.”63 For others, private property was a means of
constraining the exercise of public power. The concentration
of power in a few corporations thus posed a threat to
individual autonomy.64 As Allen Kaufman and Lawrence
Zacharias write, “modern corporate society reduced the
individual, America’s basic element of constitutional logic, to
apparent sociological irrelevance.”65
Many also worried that the concentration of wealth in a
few large corporations (and individuals) indicated that the
economy was moving toward socialism. In 1897, John P. Davis
wrote:
It is sometimes prophesied with a considerable degree
of assurance . . . that society is to attain in the near
future a stage of development in which the social unit
will be aggregate or composite instead of individual . .
. and that the corporation is the institution through
which socialism . . . is to be made effective.66

Three decades later, Brandeis, by then an Associate Justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court, warned that, unless the “great
captains of industry and finance” curb the curse of bigness,
they would be “the chief makers of socialism.”67
62 L.S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way: The Decline of
Developmental Property, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 596, 618–19 (1988).
63 Id. at 618.
64 Id. at 619.
65 Allen Kaufman & Lawrence Zacharias, From Trust to Contract: The
Legal Language of Managerial Ideology, 1920-1980, 66 BUS. HIST. REV. 523,
524 (1992).
66 John P. Davis, The Nature of Corporations, 12 POL. SCI. Q. 273, 279
n.1 (1897).
67 WINKLER, supra note 21, at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“Through size, corporations, once merely an efficient tool
employed by individuals in the conduct of private business have become an
institution—an institution which has brought such concentration of
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The separation of ownership from control in large
corporations further intensified the distress over socialism
and even communism. As Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means
would observe in 1932:
The only example of a similar subjection of the
economic interests of the individual to those of a group
which appears to the writers as being at all
comparable, is that contained in the communist
system. Though the communist ideology differs and
the communist application is more drastic, the
principle seems similar. As a qualification on what has
been known as private property in Anglo-American
law, corporate development represents a far greater
approach toward communist modalities than appears
anywhere else in our system . . . [T]he corporation
director who would subordinate the interests of the
individual stockholder to those of the group more
nearly resembles the communist in mode of thought
than he does the protagonist of private property.68

State courts sought to alleviate the growing anxiety about
socialism by focusing on workers’ welfare. For one thing, when
corporate leaders, in an attempt to avoid ruinous strikes and
dissuade workers from unionizing, began demonstrating
concern for workers and committing themselves to improving
workers’ conditions, state courts held their actions to be valid
exercises of corporate power.69 “Expenditures resulting in
stimulating the employees to better work, and promoting
faithfulness and loyalty to the employer,” were rendered
“tributary to the promotion of corporate objects.”70
Corporations could maintain “relief funds” to support
employees injured at work before workmen’s compensation
legislation was enacted, as well as pay bonuses to keep up
employee “morale” and encourage more “energetic efforts.”71
economic power that so-called private corporations are sometimes able to
dominate the state.”).
68 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 61, at 278.
69 Mitchell, supra note 7, at 166.
70 Note, Donations by a Business Corporation as Intra Vires, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 136, 136 (1931).
71 Id. at 137–38.
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In 1909, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,
announced that “[t]he enlightened spirit of the age, based
upon the experience of the past, has thrown upon the
employer other duties which involve a proper regard for the
comfort, health, safety and well-being of the employee.”72 And
in 1922, in Armstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co., a court
deemed intra vires contributions by a corporation doing
business in Buffalo, New York to the endowment funds of a
college and a university in Buffalo because they would allow
for the creation of opportunities for business training.73 By
1931, a Note in the Columbia Law Review concluded that
courts were “more ready to adjudge gratuitous corporate
contributions intra vires where the immediate benefit is
received by employees than in any other situation.”74
The U.S. Supreme Court was not oblivious to the
concentration of wealth in corporations and to the challenge
that the separation of ownership from control in large publicly
held corporations posed to the liberal understanding of
property. But the Court’s solution was reactionary rather
than progressive. State courts, without much discussion,
accepted that corporations were sovereign-like entities with
centralized management, and focused their attention on
channeling management’s power so as to alleviate social
concerns. A bastion of classical legal thought at least through
the 1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court instead drew upon
traditional rules to portray corporations as the embodiment of
liberalism. In its decisions (including Santa Clara), protecting
property rights became a tool in the fight against socialism.
For example, Justice Stephen Field, who wrote the circuit
court opinion in Santa Clara, stressed that a failure to extend
constitutional protections to corporations was “the very
essence of tyranny”—a tool in the hands of “the enemies of
capitalism.”75 As Field noted, “[i]t is a matter of history that
People ex rel. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 120 N.Y.S. 649, 651
(N.Y. App. Div. 1909).
73 285 F. 58, 58–59 (W.D.N.Y. 1922).
74 Note, supra note 70, at 136.
75 WINKLER, supra note 21, at 144–45 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
72
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unequal and discriminating taxation, leveled against special
classes, has been the fruitful means of oppressions, and the
cause of more commotions and disturbance in society, of
insurrections and revolutions, than any other cause in the
world.”76
Justice Field acknowledged the realities of corporate
power. As Margaret Blair and Elizabeth Pollman observed,
“[h]e made particular note of the miles of railway, the value of
the roads, and the 1.6 million people employed in the
operation and construction of railroads.”77 Still, Field, viewing
the corporation as an association of individuals, stressed the
importance of protecting its property rights:
[W]henever a provision of the constitution or of a law
guaranties to persons protection in their property, or
affords to them the means for its protection, or
prohibits injurious legislation affecting it, the benefits
of the provision or law are extended to corporations;
not to the name under which different persons are
united, but to the individuals composing the union.
The courts will always look through the name to see
and protect those whom the name represents. 78

Field did not hold that “corporations were constitutionally
protected persons.”79 Rather, as Ruth Bloch and Naomi
Lamoreaux explain, his opinion focused on the rights of
natural persons “who owned stock in these corporations and
who were the ones who actually bore the burden of the
unequal tax.”80
Other cases tracked Field’s analysis. As Blair and Pollman
have demonstrated, “[n]ineteenth-century cases decided after
Santa Clara do little to further flesh out the Court’s view of
the corporation, but what little they do in this regard is
76

Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 399 (C.C.D. Cal.

1883).
Blair & Pollman, supra note 13, at 1691.
Cnty. of Santa Clara, 18 F. at 403.
79 Ruth H. Bloch & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Corporations and the
Fourteenth Amendment, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 286,
291 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017).
80 Id.
77
78
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consistent with an associational view.”81 Moreover, reflecting
the common concerns of the era, the rights protected in these
cases were typically the contractual and property rights of
corporations, not their First Amendment rights.82 Indeed, in
1907 Congress passed “[t]he Tillman Act, which banned
corporations from spending money ‘in connection with’ any
federal election.”83
Property rights, Victoria Nourse explains, were viewed as
“the last line of defense against socialism.”84 By vigorously
protecting property rights, including those of corporate
members as in Santa Clara, the justices “believed that they
were standing for a far more important, much grander
principle: fighting the good fight against state socialism.”85 If
“corporations hold all their property, and the right to its use
and enjoyment, at the will of the state; [and if] it may be
invaded, seized and the companies despoiled at the state’s
pleasure,” Justice Field wrote for the circuit court in Santa
Clara, “there would be little security in the possession of
property held by such a tenure, and of course little incentive
to its acquisition or improvement.”86 The fear of socialism,
Oliver Wendell Holmes echoed a decade later in The Path of
the Law, both infected “the comfortable classes of the
community” and “influenced judicial action both here and in
England.”87 And in 1949, Justice William O. Douglas, in his
account of the history of the U.S. Supreme Court, emphasized
that
[w]e can never know how much the spectre of
socialism and the fear of assaults on capitalism
Blair & Pollman, supra note 13, at 1694.
Id. at 1695.
83 Id. at 1713 (quoting Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864
(1907)).
84 Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of
Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L.
REV. 751, 777 (2009).
85 Id. at 792–93.
86 Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 405 (C.C.D. Cal.
1883).
87 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 467 (1897).
81
82
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contributed to the decision [in Santa Clara]. But the
end result is plain: the Court itself became part of the
dynamic component of history. It did not live aloof
from the turbulence of the times. It was part of the life
of the community, absorbed from it the dominant
attitudes and feelings of the day, and moved with the
impetus of the era.88

By holding that the corporation was an aggregation of
individuals and its rights derived from its members’ rights,
the Court, in short, was fighting against potential social and
political implications of the rapidly growing publicly held
corporation and, with it, an economic system premised on
collective ownership. As Nourse explains, “[t]he rights
invoked in the early part of the twentieth century condensed
widely held, majoritarian fears of socialism and
communism.”89 By recognizing that “[t]his governmental fear,
based on the taking of private property, lent no urgency to
rights outside the economic sphere, whether they were rights
of religion or speech or privacy,”90 we can begin to understand
why, even in cases that seemed to abandon the original Santa
Clara rationale and began extending constitutional
protections to corporations as natural entities (separate from
their members), the Court limited the scope of corporate
rights to economic ones and did not aim to protect the “life and
liberty of corporations.”91
In the end, indeed, not the Court but rather Progressive
scholars’ attempts, in part in reaction to socialism, to develop

88

William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 738–39

(1949).
Nourse, supra note 84, at 797.
Id.
91 See Bloch & Lamoreaux, supra note 79, at 292–93. One would also
be mistaken, of course, to characterize all the decisions of the Lochner Court
as manifestations of fears about the advance of socialism. Nor were all the
decisions consistently pro-business. As Robert McCloskey explained, “the
Court established a kind of dialectic” protecting free enterprise from
regulation (and American society from perceived socialism), on the one
hand, and recognizing the need to protect those vulnerable to business, on
the other. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 91
(Sanford Levinson ed., 6th ed. 1994).
89
90
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a political and legal theory that would acknowledge the
realities of corporations, organizations, and other groups in
the modern administrative state, helped provide legitimacy to
the entity theory of the corporation and to corporate rights
beyond the protection of corporate property. As Part III
explores, Progressives’ writings about the corporation’s role in
the modern state helped plant the seeds for a pluralist vision
of incorporated entities that would, albeit briefly, inform the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the midcentury years.

III. PLURALIST CHALLENGES
The pluralist vision is traceable to an early-twentieth
century critique of traditional liberalism. Scholars who
embraced this pluralist vision described corporations as real,
powerful, semi-sovereign entities. In the 1940s, as fears about
the resilience of American democratic institutions in the face
of European totalitarianism replaced earlier concerns about
the power of the large publicly held corporation and socialism,
the cases before the U.S. Supreme Court involved entities
quite different from the large publicly held corporations that
occupied the justices’ attention in the early twentieth century.
These developments made the Court more willing to protect
vulnerable individuals from corporate action and vulnerable
members of organizations from state power. Influenced by
pluralist ideas, the Court imposed constitutional obligations
on different entities so as to protect the liberty rights of
individuals both within and outside organizations.92

A. The Pluralist Alternative to Socialism
While the U.S. Supreme Court focused on protecting
property rights, Progressive social scientists offered different
solutions to the problem of growing corporations. Some viewed
As I have previously demonstrated, these decisions paved the path
that led the Court to impose similar obligations on the states. See Dalia
Tsuk Mitchell, Transformations: Pluralism, Individualism and Democracy,
in TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
PROFESSOR MORTON J. HORWITZ 185, 193–94 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred
L. Brophy eds., 2009).
92
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large business units (and economies of scale) as inevitable and
sought to subject them to national control; they envisioned
federal licensing or chartering of corporations engaged in
interstate commerce.93 Other scholars called for local control
of business units so as to constrain corporate power and
encourage civic participation.94
To supplement national regulation, or to act as a form of
local control, Progressives also proposed an important role for
the individual investor, the consumer. Walter Weyl’s New
Democracy, for example, urged Americans to confront big
business and centralized markets not with the tools of local or
national regulation, but rather as enlightened consumers. 95
During World War I and in its aftermath, government officials
hoped that large-scale investment in federal debt “would
secure the ‘loyalty and solid patriotism’ of every inhabitant. .
. . [F]or he who acquired a ‘personal stake in the government’
proved ‘less susceptible to insidious suggestion’ and became ‘a
more interested, more constructive, more active citizen.’”96 As
New York’s director of publicity declared, “the spread of
‘capital’ in ‘small units throughout the majority of our
country’” provided “‘the best practical guarantee’ against
‘social unrest . . . Radicalism and Bolshevism.’”97 It wasn’t long
before widespread investment in corporate securities became
seen as “an antidote” to the large corporation’s impact on
“individual initiative, independence and enterprise.”98
The focus on individual investors grounded nationalism,
decentralization, and consumerism in the classical liberal
tradition. Another group of Progressive scholars, however,
used the corporation as a foundation for a critique of
individualism. To them, the corporation was the
quintessential example of the significance of non-

Mitchell, supra note 34, at 1516
Id.
95 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH
OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 223–27 (1996).
96 OTT, supra note 35, at 105.
97 Id.
98 LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE
TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY 103 (2007).
93
94
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individualistic legal institutions in the developing modern
American state.99 The corporation accordingly was not an
association of individuals, nor was it a natural entity that, like
individuals, was entitled to constitutional rights. Rather, the
corporation was a real entity—a separate entity with real,
sovereign-like power over individuals and other groups. 100
While adherents to the natural entity theory used the
discourse of liberal legal thought with its emphasis on natural
rights to portray the corporation as rights-bearing,
Progressive legal scholars (and legal realists) endorsed a real
entity vision of the corporation to give a normative recognition
to an already existing economic structure.101 They used the
real entity paradigm pragmatically—it was becoming an
accurate description of corporate reality, with its multiplicity
of ownership, complex financial structure, managerial control,
and immortality.102
The real entity vision of the corporation fit within a
particular ideology, namely the ideology of political pluralism
that developed in Britain and the United States amidst the
organizational revolution of the early twentieth century.103 As
farmers, workers, professionals, consumers, women, and
ethnocultural groups formed a variety of associations to
protect and advance their interests, political pluralists
described the state as too broad and abstract a body to
command loyalty and allegiance from individuals, who
associated more easily with diverse groups and organizations
than with a unified state entity.104 They argued in favor of
adding groups, organizations, and associations to the existing
array of local and state governments so as to offer a more
realistic description of democratic politics and of the (limited)
role of the liberal state.105 In their writings, debates over the
HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 72.
Tsuk, supra note 9, at 192.
101 See Mark, supra note 33, at 1465.
102 Hager, supra note 38, at 580–81; Mark, supra note 33, at 1475–76.
103 See EARL LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS: A STUDY IN
BASING-POINT LEGISLATION 12–13 (1952).
104 See Mitchell, supra note 92, at 188.
105 See, e.g., id.; JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 175 (1927)
(“[D]emocracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It
99

100
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personality of associations reflected a legitimacy crisis in
classical liberal thought.106
Political pluralism offered a progressive alternative to
European socialism. Resisting traditional liberal thought and
concerned about the radical visions of Marxists and socialists,
pluralists offered a middle ground between conservative
individualism and radical collectivism by describing groups—
specifically functional groups such as labor unions, churches,
as well as corporations—as centers of representation.107 While
traditional class analysis viewed class conflict as an inevitable
characteristic of social and political life, pluralists described
groups as “forums [where] individuals received . . . meanings
[for] their ideas and actions.”108 They celebrated the diversity
of interests in society but resisted analyses that prioritized
one social structure over others. Rather than dividing society
into classes, they described a multiplicity of groups as the

is the idea of community life itself.”); MARY P. FOLLETT, THE NEW STATE:
GROUP ORGANIZATION THE SOLUTION OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 3 (1918)
(“Group organization is to be the new method in politics, the basis of our
future industrial system, the foundation of international order[,] . . . for
creative force comes from the group, creative power is evolved through the
activity of the group life.”); Harold J. Laski, The Sovereignty of the State, 13
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 85, 96
(1916) (“[The pluralistic theory of the State] insists that the State, like every
other association, shall prove itself by what it achieves[, and it] . . . sets
group competing against group in a ceaseless striving of progressive
expansion.”). For an analysis of theories of political pluralism, see generally
AVIGAIL I. EISENBERG, RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL PLURALISM (1995).
106 HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 72; see also Hager, supra note 38, at
583–85 (describing the appeal to early-twentieth century legal thinkers of
Otto Gierke’s charge that political individualism eliminated communal
political units and thus empowered the state and capital at the expense of
individual citizens).
107 See, e.g., Daniel R. Ernst, Common Laborers? Industrial Pluralists,
Legal Realists, and the Law of Industrial Disputes, 1915–1943, 11 LAW &
HIST. REV. 59, 65 (1993) (noting that John Commons, for example,
“unfavorably contrasted Marx’s view of ‘labor as a mass’ with the craft
unionism of Samul Gompers; the latter, Commons felt, provided ‘surer
economic foundations’ for the individual liberty of wage earners” (quoting
John R. Commons, Karl Marx and Samuel Gompers, 41 POL. SCI. Q. 281,
285 (1926)).
108 Id. at 60.
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foundation of the modern state.109 “[B]y the 1920s,” Avigail
Eisenberg writes, political pluralism “was displacing the
conventional conception of the state.”110
Legal scholars expanded upon theories of political
pluralism to formulate new legal doctrines.111 Advocates of the
workers’ right to organize and corporate law scholars drew
upon theories of pluralism to portray labor unions and
corporations, respectively, as real entities whose existence
was both real and distinct from their individual members’. 112
Moreover, while, for the most part, political pluralists were
not concerned about the power that organizations might
exercise (trusting labor unions and corporations to selfregulate), many legal scholars closely examined the
boundaries of group autonomy.113 They exposed organizations,
associations, and corporations as loci not only of individual
self-government but also of coercive power (over their

See, e.g., GREGOR MCLENNAN, MARXISM, PLURALISM AND BEYOND:
CLASSIC DEBATES AND NEW DEPARTURES 20 (1989) (“US pluralists . . . tended
to posit a multiplicity of groups rather than a concentration of society into
classes.”); A. A. Berle, Jr., The Liberal Tradition in America, 3 J. ECON. &
SOCIO. 46 (1943) (“American liberal thinking has nothing in common with
the doctrine of the class war. . . . America has never been interested in the
dictatorship of the proletariat. It wants and proposes to abolish the
proletariat; to foster an American commonwealth composed of people acting
according to their abilities, without undue social disparity, and in which
everyone participates according to the use he is able to make of intellectual,
spiritual and economic freedom.”).
110 EISENBERG, supra note 105, at 63.
111 As John Dewey noted at the time, legal scholars’ fascination with
the entity paradigm was primarily due to their endorsement of different
goals. Some scholars viewed corporations as real because they desired “to
preserve the autonomy of ecclesiastic organizations.” John Dewey, The
Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 671
(1926). Others sought to defend corporate personality in order “to afford a
basis for popular government.” Id. Still others wanted “to moralize the idea
of the state, to attack the idea of irresponsible sovereignty, and, under the
influence of the pluralistic philosophy . . . to utilize the importance of the
group” to promote “group interests” like those of labor and trade unions. See
id.
112 See Hager, supra note 38, at 579–80.
113 See generally Ernst, supra note 107 (exploring the similarities and
differences among strands of pluralism).
109
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members, nonmembers, and other associations)—power that
liberal legal thought cloaked as free contractual
arrangements between individuals.114 Worried about the
power that labor unions or corporations could amass, legal
scholars such as Adolf Berle argued that courts should tame
potential abuses of that power by imposing on organizations
limitations resembling the constraints on sovereign power.
For one thing, they wanted courts to ensure that incorporated
and unincorporated entities exercised their power to benefit
the community at large.115
As Section III.B explores, by the 1940s the U.S. Supreme
Court, determined to protect American democracy from the
potential threat of European totalitarianism, seemed to
embrace the idea that groups and organizations were
constitutive elements of the American state. In a series of
decisions during that decade, the Court rendered the
discriminatory practices of private entities, including certain
corporations, unconstitutional.

B. Corporations, Pluralism, and the Constitution
Beginning in the 1930s, economic, political, and cultural
developments turned scholarly attention toward the
centrality of corporations to American society and paved the
path for pluralist ideas to begin influencing the judiciary.
Concerns about corporate power and socialism dissipated as
the New Deal regulatory state took shape.116 By the 1940s,

Id. at 62.
See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 61, at 355–56; Hager, supra note
38, at 625 (“[E]arly twentieth-century analysts and advocates thought the
real entity paradigm would help restrain corporate capital while promoting
the growth of more responsible and democratic institutions and
arrangements.”). Interestingly, Berle also believed in consumerism, wishing
to be remembered as “Marx of the [s]hareholder [c]lass.” JORDAN A.
SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 62
(1987).
116 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in
American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1688 (1988) (noting that after
the New Deal “little was left of the classical corporation” as the federal
securities acts regulated its relationship with investors, federal labor laws
114
115
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war production and the development of new industries helped
eliminate corporate debt, allowed corporations to cut prices,
and made corporations more likely to assume public
responsibilities.117 Rather than a threat to the American
dream, big business became a vehicle for achieving the
American democratic ideal.118 The corporation, Peter Drucker
wrote in 1946, was not merely an economic organization but
“America’s representative social institution.”119 As such, it
strove to fulfill “the aspirations and beliefs of the American
people.”120 The corporation was “the institution which sets the
standard for the way of life and the mode of living of our
citizens; which leads, molds and directs; which determines our
perspective on our own society; around which crystallize our
social problems and to which we look for their solution.”121 The
publicly held corporation, in short, became the quintessential
American institution.
At the same time, as American social scientists wondered
why and “how America had managed to avoid succumbing to
European totalitarianism,”122 scholarly attention turned to
the protection of ethnic and cultural minorities.123 Progressive
legal scholars focused on the economic and social needs of
different groups in society, and the early New Deal policies
emphasized the individual’s rights to work, livelihood, social
insurance, and economic independence.124 This concept of
regulated its dealing with workers, and antitrust laws regulated its
relationship with consumers and suppliers).
117 See George David Smith and Davis Dryer, Oligopoly’s Golden Age,
in COLOSSUS: HOW THE CORPORATION CHANGED AMERICA 263, 266 (Jack
Beatty ed., 2001).
118 See BOWMAN, supra note 36, at 190–91.
119 PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 4 (1946).
120 Id. at 14.
121 Id. at 6.
122 Morton Horwitz & Orlando do Campo, When and How the Supreme
Court Found Democracy—A Computer Study, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 28
(1994).
123 Id. at 28–29.
124 See William E. Forbath, Civil Rights and Economic Citizenship:
Notes on the Past and Future of the Civil Rights and Labor Movements, 2 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 697, 698–99 (1999); Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth
Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. 1609, 1632–
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social and economic citizenship gradually lost its primacy in
the late 1930s as the intellectual milieu converged on the ideal
of civil rights and liberties.125 Protecting civil rights became
the cornerstone of American democracy.126 As Morroe Berger
explained, “[d]uring the later Nineteen Thirties the Court
followed a different policy from that which guided its
predecessors; it now gave to civil rights the same preferred
position which earlier Courts had given to property rights.”127
The few cases involving corporate rights heard by the U.S.
Supreme Court reflected these midcentury changes. As
addressed in Part II, early-twentieth century cases focused on
the constitutional protection afforded to the property rights of
large, publicly held corporations.128 In the midcentury years,
the Court’s attention turned to a variety of non-business
entities within the developing American state. Particularly,
cases addressed such entities’ obligations toward members of
cultural, ethnic, or religious minorities. The Court’s
assessment of these obligations reflected a deep commitment
to democratic values and a willingness to extend or restrict
the rights of incorporated entities and similar organizations
so as to promote these values. Informed by the Progressive
discourse of pluralism, the Court used the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to limit the power of organizations
and their managements.
Most notably, in Marsh v. Alabama,129 the Court held
unconstitutional restrictions on freedom of speech imposed by
Chickasaw, a company-owned town. The question before the
Court was whether Alabama, “consistently with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, can impose criminal punishment on
34 (2001); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due
Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 380 (1988).
125 See generally supra note 124.
126 See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword, The Constitution of Change:
Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 61–
65 (1993) (discussing the emergence of democracy as a fundamental
constitutional principle during the war years).
127 Morroe Berger, The Supreme Court and Group Discrimination
since 1937, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 201, 201 (1949).
128 See supra notes 81–91 and accompanying text.
129 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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a person who undertakes to distribute religious literature on
the premises of a company-owned town contrary to the wishes
of the town’s management.”130 The appellant, Grace Marsh, a
Jehovah’s Witness, was arrested after “distributing religious
writings” in violation of the corporation’s rule.131
Cases that preceded Marsh v. Alabama subjected private
organizations
to
constitutional
limitations
because
132
government action was implicated. In Smith v. Allwright,
the Court prevented the Texas Democratic party from
excluding Black Americans from membership because the
discrimination was “state action within the meaning of the
Fifteenth Amendment.”133 And in Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville Railway Co. the Court intimated that unions
authorized under federal statute to be bargaining
representatives could not discriminate against Black
employees without violating the Equal Protection clause.134
In Marsh v. Alabama, the Court went further, concluding
that the Fourteenth Amendment could directly limit the
powers of a private corporation, the Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation, that owned and operated Chickasaw.135 Writing
for the majority, Justice Hugo Black asserted that “the
corporation’s right to control the inhabitants” of the companyowned town was not “coextensive with the right of a
homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests.” 136
“Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion,” Black
stressed.137 For one thing, when “an owner, for his advantage,
opens up his property for use by the public in general . . . his

Id. at 502.
Id. at 503–04. The State charged Marsh under a statute that
“mad[e] it a crime to enter or remain on the premises of another after having
been warned not to do so.” Id. at 504.
132 See Note, Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to Private
Organizations, 61 HARV. L. REV. 344, 346 (1948).
133 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944).
134 323 U.S. 192, 198–99 (1944).
135 Marsh, 326 U.S. 501, 502, 508.
136 Id. at 506.
137 Id.
130
131
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rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it.”138
Turning judicial focus from property rights to the interest
of the public, Justice Black explained that “[w]hether a
corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town[,]
the public in either case has an identical interest in the
functioning of the community in such manner that the
channels of communication remain free.”139 Consequently, the
corporate managers of a company town “cannot curtail the
liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with
the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees, and a state
statute . . . which enforces such action . . . clearly violates the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.”140
Progressive corporate law scholars applauded the Court’s
willingness to recognize that private organizations were semisovereign entities and thus should be subject to constitutional
constraints. “This is a new rule of law, but it is typically
American in tradition,” Adolf Berle stressed in 1952:
Under this theory certain human values are protected
by the American Constitution; any fraction of the
governmental system, economic as well as legal, is
prohibited from invading or violating them. The
principle is logical because, as has been seen, the
modern state has set up, and come to rely on, the
corporate system to carry out functions for which in
modern life by community demand the government is
held ultimately responsible. It is unlimited because it
follows corporate power whenever that power actually
exists. It resolves the conflict between the property
notion that an owner can do what he likes with his
own and the governmental concept that a public
agency is obliged to serve all alike within strict
constitutional limitations, evenhandedly, up to the
limit of its capacity. Instead of nationalizing the

Id.
Id. at 507.
140 Id. at 508.
138
139
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enterprise, this doctrine “constitutionalizes” the
operation.141

Berle believed constitutional constraints should be
imposed on all corporations. As he explained, “if there is
power, accompanied by invasion of an individual right
guaranteed by the Constitution, then it would seem that the
mere enjoyment of a state corporate charter is sufficient
justification for invoking operation of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.”142 Just as corporations could not
adopt rules, such as preferential railroad rates, that
interfered with Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce,
they also could not adopt rules burdening or denying “civil
rights whose preservation is constitutionally guaranteed.” 143
An individual’s constitutional rights trumped the exercise of
private power. As Berle put it, “a corporation, having achieved
economic power making discrimination possible,” should be
“subject[ed] to constitutional tests as to its practices and
regulations” if the latter “really invade[d] personality contrary
to some constitutional privilege.”144
By placing constitutional limitations on a private
corporation—a private actor—Marsh v. Alabama “nearly
brought about a constitutional revolution.”145 In the 1950s and
1960s, the liberal wing of the Court extended the analysis of
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railway Co. and Marsh v.
Alabama beyond the realm of labor unions and company
towns.146 In the end, however, the Court did not go so far as to
141 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate
Activity—Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic
Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 943 (1952).
142 Id. at 951–52.
143 See id. at 948.
144 See id. at 951; see also A. A. Berle, Jr., The Developing Law of
Corporate Concentration, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 661 (1952) (noting the need
to protect “the basic rights of individuals” against corporations “as they were
against the erstwhile political state”).
145 WINKLER, supra note 21, at 267.
146 For example, in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), a case
addressing the exclusion of Black Americans from voting in the primaries
of the Jaybird Democratic Association, a Texas county political
organization, the Court refused to deem the association a private
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impose constitutional constraints on organizations merely
because of their power; more broadly, it did not endorse
pluralism as an alternative to liberalism.
Indeed, less revolutionary were cases where the Court’s
commitment to protecting the American ideal of democracy
led it to extend the rights associated with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to incorporated entities. In 1958,
responding to attempts by Southern officials to force the
NAACP to reveal its membership lists, the Court announced
“that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”147 In this
case, freedom of association required granting immunity to
the NAACP from state scrutiny of its membership lists.148 As
Justice John Marshall Harlan carefully put it:
The Association both urges that it is constitutionally
entitled to resist official inquiry into its membership
lists, and that it may assert, on behalf of its members,
a right personal to them to be protected from
compelled disclosure by the State of their affiliation
with the Association as revealed by the membership
lists. We think that petitioner argues more
appropriately the rights of its members, and that its
nexus with them is sufficient to permit that it acts as
their representative before this Court.149

Like the cases imposing constitutional limitations on
private corporations, cases embracing organizations’ rights
reflected the Warren Court’s recognition, as pluralists argued,
of the diverse centers of representation and power in the
organization to which constitutional constraints did not apply. Writing for
the Court, Justice Black noted that “[t]he only election that has counted in
this Texas county for more than fifty years has been that held by the
Jaybirds from which Negroes were excluded . . . . The effect of the whole
procedure, Jaybird primary plus Democratic primary plus general election,
is to do precisely that which the Fifteenth Amendment forbids[.]” Id. at 469–
70.
147 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
148 Id. at 466.
149 Id. at 458–59 (emphasis added).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3917564

MITCHELL

276

6/11/2021 2:02 PM

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2021

modern state. The role of the law was thus to correct
imbalances of group power that permeated social, cultural,
and legal relationships. Yet, by embracing the rights of
organizations such as the NAACP to assert the liberty rights
of their individual members, the Court inadvertently opened
the door for other entities, especially large corporations, to
claim the same rights. Focusing on Justice William O.
Douglas’s concurrence in Bell v. Maryland, Section III.C
demonstrates that endowing corporations with liberty rights
did not follow from the idea that corporations were real
entities, or from the pluralist paradigm more broadly. Indeed,
as Part IV will elaborate, by the time the Court granted
corporations First Amendment rights, a different vision—
managerialism—influenced its opinions.

C. Pluralism, not Liberalism
At issue in Bell v. Maryland were the criminal trespass
convictions of twelve Black students who participated in a
“sit-in” demonstration at a restaurant in Baltimore.150 By the
time the case came before the U.S. Supreme Court, “Maryland
ha[d] enacted laws that abolish[ed] the crime of which
petitioners were convicted.”151 The Court accordingly vacated
and reversed the judgments, remanding the case “so that the
state court may consider the effect of the supervening change
in state law.”152
Critical of the Court’s refusal to address a “question . . . at
the root of demonstrations, unrest, riots, and violence in
various areas,” a question that “consumes the public
attention,” Justice Douglas authored a concurring opinion,
elaborating why corporations, such as the Baltimore
restaurant, should not be granted liberty rights.153 Contrary
to the dissenting justices, who would have affirmed the
convictions and viewed the question as focused on “a person’s

Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 227–28 (1964).
Id. at 228.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 243 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
150
151
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‘personal prejudices’” and whether a person “may dictate the
way in which he uses his property and whether he can enlist
the aid of the State to enforce those ‘personal prejudices,’”
Douglas stressed that corporations were not persons.154
Like Justice Black in Marsh v. Alabama, Douglas
recognized that corporations were real, sovereign-like
entities, but, as he argued, real was different from natural.
Corporations were real entities due to their governance and
financial structures, but they were not natural entities akin
to natural persons. “The corporation that owns this
restaurant,” Douglas wrote “did not refuse service . . . because
‘it’ did not like” these students.155 Rather,
[t]he reason “it” refused service was because “it”
thought “it” could make more money by running a
segregated restaurant[.]
....
. . . . Moreover, when corporate restaurateurs are
involved, whose “personal prejudices” are being
protected? The stockholders’? The directors’? The
officers’? The managers’? The truth is, I think, that the
corporate interest is in making money, not in
protecting “personal prejudices.”156

As real entities, corporations could claim rights relevant to
their operations, but not the liberty rights of natural persons.
As Douglas put it, the issue in Bell v. Maryland was different
from previous situations where corporations were “entitled to
the attorney-client privilege. . . .[,] protected as a publisher by
the Freedom of the Press Clause of the First Amendment. . . .[,
or] entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures by reason of the Fourth Amendment.”157 The right of
association, which the restaurants invoked, was a personal
right (similar to “the privilege of self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment [that] cannot be utilized

Id. at 245.
Id.
156 Id. at 245–46.
157 Id. at 263 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
154
155
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by a corporation”), and corporations, Douglas stressed, did not
have personal rights, just as they had no choice or will.158
Even if the Court were to derive the rights of the
corporation from the rights of its shareholders, Douglas
insisted that a sharp distinction existed between the economic
and liberty rights not only of the corporation but also of the
corporation’s shareholders. As he explained,
[i]t is said that ownership of property carries the right
to use it in association with such people as the owner
chooses. The corporate owners in these cases—the
stockholders—are unidentified members of the public
at large, who probably never saw these petitioners,
who may never have frequented these restaurants.
What personal rights of theirs would be vindicated by
affirmance? Why should a stockholder in Kress,
Woolworth, Howard Johnson, or any other corporate
owner in the restaurant field have standing to say that
any associational rights personal to him are involved?
Why should his interests—his associational rights—
make it possible to send these Negroes to jail? 159

Douglas acknowledged that in certain scenarios the Court
could pierce the corporate veil and allow corporations to assert
the liberty rights of their members. As he wrote a year earlier,
“[a] free society is made up of almost innumerable institutions
through which views and opinions are expressed, opinion is
mobilized, and social, economic, religious, educational, and
political
programs
are
formulated.”160
Accordingly,
“government can neither legislate with respect to nor probe
the intimacies of political, spiritual, or intellectual
relationships in the myriad of lawful societies and groups,
whether popular or unpopular, that exist in this country.” 161
And the NAACP, for example, “could assert on behalf of its
members a right personal to them to be protected from

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 261–62.
160 William O. Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
1361, 1373 (1963).
161 Id. at 1375.
158
159
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compelled disclosure by the State of their affiliation with it.” 162
But this was not the case in Bell v. Maryland. “There are
occasions when the corporation is little more than a veil for
man and wife or brother and brother; and disregarding the
corporate entity often is the instrument for achieving a just
result. But the relegation of a Negro customer to second-class
citizenship is not just,” Douglas wrote.163 “Nor is fastening
apartheid on America a worthy occasion for tearing aside the
corporate veil.”164
Drawing distinctions between economic and liberty rights,
and between organizations such as the NAACP and business
corporations, was critical for another reason. Douglas stressed
that, given the governance structure of corporations,
recognizing corporations’ constitutional rights simply
empowered their managements. As he pointedly put it,
granting liberty rights to corporations would merely hand
“corporate management vast dimensions for social
planning.”165
Affirmance would make corporate management the
arbiter of one of the deepest conflicts in our society:
corporate management could then enlist the aid of
state police, state prosecutors, and state courts to force
apartheid on the community they served, if apartheid
best suited the corporate need; or, if its profits would
be better served by lowering the barriers of
segregation, it could do so.166

In short, it was one thing to impose obligations on
corporate managers (as Marsh v. Alabama implicitly did), or
to protect the rights of members of the NAACP, so as to
promote social and cultural goals. It was quite another thing
to grant managers the power to determine these goals.
Bell v. Maryland raised significant questions about the role
and nature of corporations. Douglas’s decision offered a path
Bell, 378 U.S. at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
163 Id. at 271.
164 Id.
165 See id. at 264.
166 Id.
162
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for embracing the idea that corporations were real entities
subject to constitutional obligations without also accepting
that they were endowed with constitutional rights. But, as
Part IV explores, when Bell was decided, pluralism was
competing with a different vision—namely managerialism—
that rapidly took hold in state courts during the midcentury
years; managerialism offered the Court a unique justification
for upholding corporate liberty rights and, indeed,
empowering corporate managers to arbitrate political, social,
and cultural conflicts.

IV. MANAGERIALIST SOLUTIONS
Managerialism dominated state corporate law in the
midcentury years. Like pluralists, managerialists recognized
that corporations were real, powerful institutions. Yet, rather
than expecting the federal government or the courts to limit
corporate action, managerialists trusted corporate managers
to do so. When, in the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court began
granting corporations liberty rights, its decisions were
informed by the managerialist paradigm; managers were
empowered to determine corporate actions, including those
affecting the liberty rights of others.

A. Managerialism: Pluralism Reimagined
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, midcentury state courts,
responsible for resolving questions of corporate governance
under state corporate law, were keen on ensuring that
corporations contribute to the success of the modern American
state.167 Yet, while embracing the idea that corporations were
real entities, state courts did not seek to tame their powers as
pluralists did; rather, they focused on the role of corporations
167 See Carroll R. Wetzel & James L. Winokur, Corporations and the
Public Interest—a Review of the Corporate Purpose and Business Judgment
Rules, 27 BUS. LAW. 235, 237 (1971) (“As money and power have become
concentrated in corporate enterprises, those enterprises have become an
increasingly critical source of funds for public works, and corporate
decisions have come increasingly to determine the quality of American life.
This has not been overlooked by the managers or by the courts.”).
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and corporate managers in guarding American democracy.
Take, for example, A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v.
Barlow,168 a test case brought by the National Association of
Manufacturers seeking a court declaration that corporate
contributions to private institutions of higher education were
intra vires.169 Choosing to make a broad statement about the
nature and purpose of the corporation, Justice Nathan L.
Jacobs of the Supreme Court of New Jersey stressed the
critical role corporations played in defending American ideals:
During the first world war corporations loaned their
personnel and contributed substantial corporate
funds in order to insure survival; during the
depression of the ‘30s they made contributions to
alleviate the desperate hardships of the millions of
unemployed; and during the second world war they
again contributed to insure survival. They now
recognize that we are faced with other, though
nonetheless vicious, threats from abroad which must
be withstood without impairing the vigor of our
democratic institutions at home and that otherwise
victory will be pyrrhic indeed. More and more they
have come to recognize that their salvation rests upon
[a] sound economic and social environment which in
turn rests in no insignificant part upon free and
vigorous nongovernmental institutions of learning. 170

Justice Jacobs’s reference to “our democratic institutions
at home” and his insistence that corporations were the
foundation upon which American democracy could thrive
reflected the midcentury obsession with democratic theory.171
But Jacobs’s decision reached further. Viewing charitable
contributions as critical for ensuring the survival of American
democracy, he declared them intra vires and left them to
managerial discretion.172 Management could choose to make
certain contributions despite shareholders’ or other
98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
Mitchell, supra note 7, at 183.
170 A. P. Smith Mfg. Co., 98 A.2d at 586.
171 See Horwitz & do Campo, supra note 122, at 28.
172 See A. P. Smith Mfg. Co., 98 A.2d at 589–90.
168
169
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stakeholders’ disapproval, but it was not required to do so
even if these stakeholders so wished. Corporations and their
managements were free to exercise their power without
constraints.173 As Adolf Berle wrote a few years later, “modern
directors [were] not limited to running business enterprise for
maximum profit, but [were] in fact and recognized in law as
administrators of a community system.”174
Corporate managers were viewed as necessary for the
success of American democracy, and their authority to run
their corporations could not be challenged.175 Government
regulation of corporate power was characterized as
regimented, if not directly similar to the policies of dictatorial
regimes.176 The term “free enterprise,” in use since the 1930s,
became associated with the free reign of managers who, in the
cultural imagination, replaced the small producers and
entrepreneurs of the nineteenth century.177 Freedom of
enterprise, that is, the freedom of the enterprise’s managers,
was singled out as ensuring America’s strength and future.178

See Mitchell, supra note 7, at 192–94.
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SOCIETY ix, xii (Edward S. Mason ed., 1960); see also Wolfgang G.
Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law,
57 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 171 (1957).
175 See Wells, supra note 15, at 326.
176 See ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE
OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS
323–24 (1998).
177 See, e.g., Daniel Bell, The Power Elite—Reconsidered, 64 AM. J.
SOCIO. 238, 247 (1958) (reviewing C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE
(Oxford Univ. Press 1956)) (discussing the shift from “‘private property’ to
‘enterprise,’ as the justification of power”); Peter F. Drucker, The Employee
Society, 58 AM. J. SOCIO. 358, 359 (1953) (discussing the emergence of a “new
ruling group in our society” called “management” whose “power . . . rest[s]
solely on [its] indispensable function”); Davita Silfen Glasberg & Michael
Schwartz, Ownership and Control of Corporations, 9 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 311,
313 (1983) (discussing “managerial theory[’s]” description of a “class of
corporate leaders . . . freed from outside pressures” with “unconstrained
power” and without “the . . . incentive . . . to misuse” it (citation omitted)).
178 See MARCHAND, supra note 176, at 322.
173
174

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3917564

MITCHELL

No. 1:243]

6/11/2021 2:02 PM

BUSINESS AS USUAL

283

A new cadre of managers supported this transformation. 179
For one thing, General Motors, the subject of Peter Drucker’s
famous Concept of the Corporation, was divided into separate
units, each one “responsible for all its commercial operations.
Each had its own engineering, production, and sales
departments, but was supervised by a central staff
responsible for overall policy and finance.”180 “[E]xecutives
had more time to” focus “on strategic issues” while
“operational decisions were made by people in the front
line.”181 The large public corporation and its organizational
and leadership structures came to represent the success of the
American economic and political system.182 Corporate
executives seemed to possess the expertise required to lead
corporations and the country.183
Focusing on management’s function or “status
relationship” to the corporation and on its expertise, social
scientists argued that corporate managers were best situated
to control business affairs, and to exercise authority over
others in the corporate structure and corporate power over
those outside the firm.184 Expert management became the
“strategic center” of the large publicly held corporation.185
Management dominated the corporate bureaucracy,
organized production, and exercised power over individual
lives within the corporation and market transactions outside
it.186 In 1957, reflecting this transformation, Carl Kaysen
celebrated professional managers, noting that management
179 See STUART CRAINER, THE MANAGEMENT CENTURY: A CRITICAL
REVIEW OF 20TH CENTURY THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 55 (2000) (noting that
business leaders pushed for more decentralized (and more managerially
complex) corporations; such corporations constituted around twenty percent
of Fortune 500 companies in 1950 and eighty percent in 1970).
180 Id. at 54.
181 Id. at 55.
182 DRUCKER, supra note 119, at 5.
183 See BOWMAN, supra note 36, at 190–91.
184 See Drucker, supra note 177, at 359; William W. Bratton, Jr., The
“Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
407, 413–14 (1989).
185 William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm:
Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1989).
186 See BOWMAN, supra note 36, at 197–98.
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no longer viewed itself as “the agent of proprietorship seeking
to maximize return on investment.”187 Rather, “management
s[aw] itself as responsible to stockholders, employees,
customers, the general public, and, perhaps most important,
the firm itself as an institution.”188
Corporations were not equipped to determine social
priorities and lacked any democratic authority to do so,189 but
corporate leaders were quick to argue that responsible
corporate management could reconcile the corporation’s
interest with the public good and help the nation.190 And state
courts acquiesced, assuming that by empowering managers to
pursue social goals, they allowed corporations to continue to
serve their role in protecting American democracy.191 As
Section IV.B explores, by the 1970s, as the U.S. Supreme
Court began granting corporations constitutional rights, it
endorsed management’s exercise of corporate power even
when it affected the liberty rights of individuals outside and
within the corporation.

B. Managerialism and the Emergence of Corporate
Rights
Different developments converged to shift the Court’s
attention away from corporate obligations and toward
corporate rights. The Warren Court’s decisions were grounded
in what Morton Horwitz labeled “a rich conception of
democracy”—that is, in the understanding that “greater social
inclusiveness and empowerment of minorities” was not in
tension with democracy but rather “an extension of
democratic values.”192 By the 1970s, however, American
jurists turned their attention from the protection of
vulnerable groups and toward democratic processes as a
187 Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation,
47 AM. ECON. REV. 311, 313 (1957).
188 Id; see also Gerald F. Davis, Twilight of the Berle and Means
Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121, 1125–26 (2011).
189 MARCHAND, supra note 176, at 363.
190 See Kaufman & Zacharias, supra note 65, at 528.
191 See Mitchell, supra note 7, at 190.
192 Horwitz, supra note 126, at 63.
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means of ensuring the continued success of American
democracy. Embracing a vision of the polity as composed of
multiple interest groups interacting and trading ends in
political markets, legal scholars were more inclined to endorse
the pluralists’ celebration of group autonomy than their
imposition of constraints on group power.193 The American
state was reimagined as a political compromise among various
pressure groups, including corporations, while political
markets were trusted to produce shared public goods. So long
as individuals were allowed freely to associate to promote
their shared interests, and so long as everyone had access to
political markets, inequalities of power and vulnerabilities
were deemed irrelevant.194
In this atmosphere, concerns about the property rights of
private entities overshadowed reservations about group
power, and the conservative wing of the Court was able to
override the legal pluralists’ influence. For one thing, in
Hudgens v. NLRB the Court held that union members did not
have a First Amendment right to enter a private shopping
mall to picket one of its stores.195 Writing for the Court,
Justice Potter Stewart stressed “that the constitutional
guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against
abridgment by government, federal or state.”196 It offers no
remedy “against a private corporation or a person who seeks
to abridge the free expression of others.”197
According to Justice Stewart, Marsh v. Alabama was a
unique case where “a private enterprise [assumed] all of the
attributes of a state-created municipality,” and “the owner of
the company town . . . perform[ed] the full spectrum of
municipal powers and stood in the shoes of the State.”198 In all
other cases involving privately owned property, the public,
even when invited as customers, did not have First
Amendment rights as it “would have on the similar public
See Mitchell, supra note 92, at 201–02.
On these developments, see id. at 201–04.
195 424 U.S. 507, 520–21 (1976).
196 Id. at 513.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 519.
193
194
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facilities in the streets of a city or town.”199 Seemingly
untroubled by the power that groups and associations,
including corporations, could exercise over individuals, the
Court chose to protect the property rights of private entities
as if they were individuals.
The late-twentieth century evolution of corporations’ First
Amendment rights similarly reflected the broader
jurisprudential shift from substantive evaluations of power
and vulnerability to trust in democratic processes and free
markets.200 In the mid-1970s, Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen
Litigation Group challenged a Virginia statute that declared
the advertising of prices of prescription drugs by pharmacists
“unprofessional conduct.”201 While at the time “[i]t was taken
for granted that the government could regulate commercial
speech as part of its power to regulate commerce,”202 the
Group argued that “the First Amendment entitles the user of
prescription drugs to receive information that pharmacists
wish to communicate to them through advertising and other
promotional means, concerning the prices of such drugs.” 203
And Justice Harry Blackmun, for the Court, embraced their
consumer-focused argument.204 Beginning his decision with a
strong affirmation of the importance of a free flow of
information in a democracy, Blackmun wrote: “Freedom of
speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker
exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”205

Id.
See Mitchell, supra note 92, at 201–4.
201 See Alan B. Morrison, No Regrets (Almost): After Virginia Board of
Pharmacy, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 949, 949 (2017); Va. State Pharmacy
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 749–
50 (1976).
202 Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Supreme Court’s View
of Corporate Rights: Two Centuries of Evolution and Controversy, in
CORPORATIONS AND DEMOCRACY 245, 276 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William
J. Novak eds., 2017).
203 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 753–54.
204 Id. at 766–70; WINKLER, supra note 21, at 297.
205 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756 (footnote omitted).
199
200
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Reflecting still the midcentury focus on the protection of
those vulnerable in our society, Justice Blackmun stressed
that
[a]s to the particular consumer’s interest in the free
flow of commercial information, that interest may be
as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the
day’s most urgent political debate. Appellees’ case in
this respect is a convincing one. Those whom the
suppression of prescription drug price information
hits the hardest are the poor, the sick, and
particularly the aged. A disproportionate amount of
their income tends to be spent on prescription drugs;
yet they are the least able to learn, by shopping from
pharmacist to pharmacist, where their scarce dollars
are best spent.206

Yet, the decision was not limited to the protection of
vulnerable consumers. Reaching beyond, perhaps, what
Nader’s Group intended,207 Justice Blackmun, while keen on
distinguishing commercial from political speech,208 further
held that “speech does not lose its First Amendment
protection because money is spent to project it”209—even if
“the advertiser’s interest is purely economic one[,] [t]hat
hardly disqualifies him from protection under the First
Amendment.”210
Two years later, in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,211 Justice Lewis Powell extended First Amendment
protection to corporate political speech by looking, again, at
the nature of the speech and its audience rather than the
speaker. The case involved a challenge to a Massachusetts law
that barred “certain expenditures by banks and business
corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on
referendum proposals.”212 While the lower court “framed the
Id. at 763.
See Morrison, supra note 201, at 950.
208 WINKLER, supra note 21, at 297–8.
209 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
210 Id. at 762.
211 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
212 Id. at 767.
206
207
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principal question . . . as whether and to what extent
corporations have First Amendment rights,”213 Powell’s
analysis focused on “interests broader than those of the party
seeking their vindication.”214 The question, accordingly, was
“not whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights and,
if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural
persons,” but rather whether the statute in question “abridges
expression that the First Amendment was meant to
protect.”215 As Margaret Blair and Elizabeth Pollman write,
the Court’s articulated reason for striking down the
restrictions on corporate speech was a “new, instrumental
rationale for extending a right to a corporation—the need to
protect the interests of people outside the corporation, in this
case the listeners, rather than deriving a right from people
involved in the corporation.”216
Bellotti, like Virginia Board of Pharmacy, was
transformative in another way. Both cases turned to the
marketplace of ideas theory to justify the extension of speech
rights to commercial and corporate entities.217 In a statement
affirming the importance of corporations to the free market of
ideas, yet downplaying their unparalleled power to influence
this market,218 Justice Powell’s decision in Bellotti stressed:
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one
would suggest that the State could silence their
proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable
to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less
true because the speech comes from a corporation
rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public
Id. at 775–76.
Id. at 776.
215 Id.; see also WINKLER, supra note 21, at 318–19.
216 Blair & Pollman, supra note 202, at 279.
217 On the marketplace of ideas, see, e.g., generally Stanley Ingber,
The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1.
218 In fact, Powell rejected the appellee’s argument that corporate
“participation would exert an undue influence on the outcome of a
referendum vote, and—in the end—destroy the confidence of the people in
the democratic process and the integrity of government” as lacking
sufficient evidence. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789–90.
213
214
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does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether
corporation,
association,
union,
or
individual.219

Gone were the pluralists’ concerns about corporate power
that characterized the midcentury years. Gone also was the
Supreme Court’s use of the Constitution to tame corporate
power. In a world committed to free markets, the corporation
finally won its First Amendment rights; corporate speech, like
any other speech, was protected. Moreover, if corporate speech
was protected, as Justice Douglas pointed out in Bell v.
Maryland, managers were free to contribute to public debates
as they deemed fit, without restrictions from corporate
shareholders, other stakeholders, or the courts. Reacting to
demands by business and consumer groups, the Court
responded with managerialism.
The association between corporate rights and
managerialism was not lost on Justice Powell, who, as a
corporate lawyer, urged business executives to use corporate
resources to defend the “free enterprise system.”220
Recognizing that by protecting corporate speech the Court
was legitimizing the power of corporate managers to
determine how corporations should exercise their First
Amendment rights, Powell was quick to point out that
corporate law offered recourse to shareholders—whose
investment presumably funded corporate speech—should
they disapprove of their managers’ actions. As he noted,
[u]ltimately shareholders may decide, through the
procedures of corporate democracy, whether their
corporation should engage in debate on public issues.
Acting through their power to elect the board of
directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the

219 Id. at 777 (footnotes omitted); see also David Graver, Comment,
Personal Bodies: A Corporeal Theory of Corporate Personhood, 6 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 235, 236 (1999) (discussing Bellotti’s rationale).
220 WINKLER, supra note 21, at 286–87; see also Nikolas Bowie,
Corporate Democracy: How Corporations Justified Their Right to Speak in
1970s Boston, 36 L. & HIST. REV. 943 (2018) (discussing Powell’s ideas and
demonstrating how the executives of the First National Bank of Boston used
these ideas to defend the Bank’s political speech).
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corporation’s charter, shareholders normally are
presumed competent to protect their own interests. In
addition to intracorporate remedies, minority
shareholders generally have access to the judicial
remedy of a derivative suit to challenge corporate
disbursements alleged to have been made for
improper corporate purposes or merely to further the
personal interests of management.221

No longer bothered by corporate power, Powell turned to
the corporation’s internal structure. His rhetoric of corporate
democracy echoed decisions of state courts. Focused on the
fiduciary duties of directors to shareholders (to the exclusion
of other stakeholders), state courts have consistently turned
to the ideal of representative democracy to rationalize
managerialism.222 Shareholders were “expected to elect
directors” who would choose managers to “execute the general
policies laid down by the directors.”223 However, shareholders
could not order or command their directors or managers.
Management’s discretion, including its prerogative to
determine the corporation’s speech and social responsibilities,
could not be limited by reference to the shareholders’ wishes
(or objections).224
Indeed, as this Article concludes, even when the Delaware
courts in the 1980s seemed to endorse shareholder wealth
maximization as the corporation’s single purpose, they
continued to empower corporate managers to run corporations
without interference from their shareholders (or the courts).225
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions addressing corporate
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794–95 (footnote omitted).
See Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Status Bound: The Twentieth Century
Evolution of Directors’ Liability, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 63, 113–14 (2009).
223 Thomas F. Woodlock, Careless Owners: How Shall the Supreme
Inertia of the American Stockholder Be Overcome?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22,
1931, at 1.
224 See Mitchell, supra note 222, at 113–14.
225 See, e.g., Mark S. Mizruchi, Berle and Means Revisited: The
Governance and Power of Large U.S. Corporations, 33 THEORY & SOC’Y 579,
605–06, 609 (2004) (noting that managers may be less autonomous than in
the past but also that they remain meaningfully independent from
investors).
221
222
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rights in the last decades of the twentieth century followed
closely. Hobby Lobby was the natural outcome.

V. EPILOGUE
The election of Ronald Reagan cemented free economic and
political markets as the cornerstones of American democracy.
As Kent Greenfield writes, “Reagan embodied a new Zeitgeist.
He railed against government regulation, took pride in
breaking up the power of public-sector unions, and ushered in
an era in which people were encouraged to feel good about
making money.”226 Reagan “fostered a belief in . . . the
market.”227 While Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal focused on
providing for the vulnerable in our society, a focus that carried
through to the Warren Court, “Reagan ushered in the 1980s
proclaiming, ‘What I want to see above all is that this country
remains a country where someone can always get rich.’”228
With no real threats to American democracy to which
corporations were to respond, investment bankers and their
lawyers introduced shareholder wealth maximization as the
only purpose of corporate law, bringing investors to the
frontlines of corporate governance.229 Retelling the story of
managerialism as a narrative about a “self-serving
managerial class [that] squandered corporate resources
extravagantly on themselves . . . and allowed foreign
competitors to overtake the United States in productivity,
innovation, and strategy,”230 investment bankers called for
taking over and breaking down the conglomerates of the
postwar
years,
thus
“‘unlocking’
the
value
of
‘underperforming’ stock prices” to benefit the shareholders.231
And the Delaware courts seemingly followed suit. “[W]hile

226 KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY
SHOULD ACT LIKE IT) 44 (2018).
227 Id. at 44–45.
228 Id. at 45.
229 KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET 129–33
(2009).
230 Id. at 130.
231 See id.
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concern for various corporate constituencies is proper when
addressing a takeover threat,” the Delaware Supreme Court
held in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.
“that principle is limited by the requirement that there be
some rationally related benefit accruing to the
stockholders.”232 Managers were responsible for maximizing
value for their shareholders, and shareholders learned not
only to expect but also to demand appreciation on their stock
price.233
The U.S. Supreme Court also appeared more focused on
the needs of shareholders in its decisions regarding corporate
speech. Take, for one, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, in which the Michigan Chamber of Commerce
challenged the Michigan Campaign Finance Act’s prohibition
on the usage of “corporate treasury funds for independent
expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, any candidates
in election for state office.”234 Upholding the restrictions, the
Court stressed that the “special advantages” granted to
corporations (e.g., “limited liability [and] perpetual life”),
“enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their
resources in ways that maximize the return on their
shareholders’ investments.”235 But these same advantages
also allow corporations “to use ‘resources amassed in the
economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the
political marketplace,’” a distortion that the government had
a compelling interest in preventing.236 Notably, Justice
William Brennan in concurrence emphasized that the law
“protect[ed] dissenting shareholders of business corporations
. . . to the extent that such shareholders oppose the use of their

232 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
176 (Del. 1986).
233 See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Who Needs the Stock Market? Part I:
The Empirical Evidence 24–25 (Nov. 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292403 (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review).
234 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990).
235 Id. at 658–59.
236 Id. at 659 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)).
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money . . . for political campaigns.”237 Writing perhaps to rebut
Bellotti’s rhetoric of shareholder democracy, Brennan stressed
that “shareholders in a large business corporation may find it
prohibitively expensive to monitor the activities of the
corporation to determine whether it is making expenditures
to which they object.”238
But the focus on shareholders was proven to be largely
rhetorical. While emphasizing their commitment to
shareholder wealth maximization, the Delaware courts did
not seek to ensure that shareholders profit; for the most part,
they used shareholder wealth maximization to empower
managers, for example, by offering them a ready justification
for thwarting hostile takeovers.239 If Wall Street investment
bankers promoted shareholder wealth maximization as a
means of limiting managerial power, the Delaware courts
embraced it to ensure that managers remained in control. 240
“Delaware law confers the management of the corporate
enterprise to the stockholders’ duly elected board
representatives,” Justice Henry Horsey stressed in
Paramount Communications v. Time Inc.,241 a case involving
directors blocking a tender offer at almost twice the stock’s
market price.242 Dissatisfied shareholders were advised to
exercise their voting power,243 even as the Delaware courts
acknowledged that the shareholders’ vote was “a vestige or a
ritual of little practical importance.”244
The U.S. Supreme Court followed a similar course. In
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court
overruled Austin, removing restrictions on corporate
Id. at 673 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 674 n.5.
239 See Mitchell, supra note 34, at 1573–74.
240 Mitchell, supra note 7, at 209–11.
241 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989).
242 See id. at 1149.
243 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985)
(“If the stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected
representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to
turn the board out.”).
244 Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(acknowledging this as the “conventional” view).
237
238
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independent expenditures for political speech.245 In so doing,
even though Citizens United was a nonprofit organization, the
Court also endorsed Justice Scalia’s statements in Austin with
respect to dissenting shareholders. As Scalia had pointedly
put it, shareholders in for-profit corporations understand “the
deal”; they “know[] that management may take any action
that is ultimately in accord with what the majority (or a
specified supermajority) of the shareholders wishes, so long as
that action is designed to make a profit.”246 A dissenting
shareholder who is unable “to persuade a majority (or a
requisite minority) of his fellow shareholders that the action
should not be taken,” can simply “sell his stock.”247
Presumably embracing the idea that corporations were
associations of individuals, and that corporations’ liberty
rights were derived from the rights of their individual
members,248 Citizens United offered little protection to
shareholders who opposed their corporations’ speech. Just as
the Delaware courts have used the rhetoric of shareholder
democracy to justify managerial power, so did the U.S.
Supreme Court. Quoting Bellotti, Justice Anthony Kennedy
simply concluded: “There is . . . little evidence of abuse that
cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures
of corporate democracy.’”249
“The shareholder franchise,” Chancellor Allen succinctly
put it, “is the ideological underpinning upon which the
legitimacy of directorial power rests.”250 Indeed, by the early
twenty-first century, not corporations but their managers
gained significant rights. Viewed through a managerialist
perspective, Hobby Lobby did not undermine Delaware’s
corporate law. Rather, like contemporaneous Delaware cases,
245 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010), overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Com., 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
246 Austin, 494 U.S. at 686 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
247 Id. at 687.
248 WINKLER, supra note 21, at 364.
249 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978))). On the treatment of
shareholders’ rights in Citizens United, see Sarah C. Haan, Voter Primacy,
83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2655, 2670–79 (2015).
250 Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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it empowered managers, who in this case were also
shareholders, to determine the corporation’s goals. As Justice
Alito, who wrote the majority opinion, stressed, the
corporation is “simply a form of organization used by human
beings to achieve desired ends,” and the law determines “the
rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders,
officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation
in one way or another. . . . Corporations, ‘separate and apart
from’ the human beings who own, run, and are employed by
them, cannot do anything at all.”251
As to shareholder wealth maximization, Justice Alito
pointedly noted that “[w]hile it is certainly true that a central
objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modern
corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to
pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do
not do so.”252 Notably, Alito stressed that “ownership
approval” is required before for-profit corporations could
support “charitable causes.”253 Yet, he added, “it is not at all
uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and
other altruistic objectives.”254 Moreover, lest he were
misunderstood as to who, between shareholders and
managers, will determine the appropriate corporate goal,
Alito was careful to note that, in cases of disagreement
between owners, the Court will turn to corporate structure
“and the underlying state law in resolving disputes.”255
Accordingly, Hobby Lobby, the culmination of century-long
debates about the nature and purpose of corporate entities,
simply affirmed what state courts have long endorsed:
corporations are entities created by a charter from the state;
as such they cannot exercise their rights or define their
purpose, but their managers certainly can.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. 682, 706–07 (2014)
(emphasis omitted).
252 Id. at 711–12.
253 Id. at 712.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 719.
251
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